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THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUBSIDY IN 
KOREA: CRITICISM FROM A PERSPECTIVE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY
Claire Junga Kim1
Abstract: The Korean government’s new policy of subsidizing assisted reproductive technology (ART) fees to increase the 
birth rate reflects a lack of concern for future generations and their quality of life. It seems wrong to treat the future child as 
just a number that contributes to achieving the target birth rate, or as a mere means of solving a problem facing the current 
generation. However, when one tries to articulate the shortcomings of this new policy, one realizes that the ontological arguments 
surrounding this issue, namely the non-identity problem is complex. I propose the concept of reproductive responsibility as a 
response to the possible life. This concept presupposes a relationship between the reproductive agent and the possible new 
life. Since the concept draws the normative standard from that relationship, it resolves the non-identity problem and makes 
it possible to criticize the new policy of subsidizing ART. 
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El subsidio para la  tecnología de reproducción asistida en Corea: crítica desde una perspectiva de responsabilidad 
reproductiva
Resumen: La nueva política del gobierno de Corea de proporcionar subsidio para los costos de la tecnología de reproducción 
asistida (TRA), para incrementar el número de nacimientos, refleja falta de preocupación por las futuras generaciones y su 
calidad de vida. Parece equivocado tratar a un niño futuro como un número que contribuye a lograr la frecuencia de nacimientos 
objetivo, como un mero medio para resolver un problema que enfrenta la generación presente. Sin embargo, cuando uno trata 
de articular las deficiencias de esta nueva política, se da cuenta de que los argumentos ontológicos sobre el tema son complejos, 
principalmente el problema de falta de identidad. Propongo el concepto de "responsabilidad reproductiva" como respuesta a 
la posible vida. Este concepto presupone una relación entre el agente reproductivo y la posibilidad de nueva vida. Debido a 
que el concepto extrae su normatividad de esta relación, se resuelve el problema de falta de identidad y hace posible criticar 
la nueva política de proporcionar subsidio a TRA.
Palabras clave: reproducción, derechos reproductivos, responsabilidad reproductiva, tecnología de reproducción asistida
A subvenção tecnológica de reprodução assistida na Coreia: uma crítica a partir de uma perspectiva de 
responsabilidade reprodutiva
Resumo: A nova política de governo coreano de subsidiar a tecnologia de reprodução assistida (ART) para aumentar a taxa de 
natalidade reflete uma falta de preocupação com a geração futura e sua qualidade de vida. Parece errado tratar a futura criança 
como apenas um número que contribui para atingir a meta de taxa de natalidade, ou como um mero meio de resolver um 
problema que enfrentam a atual geração. No entanto, quando tenta-se articular as deficiências desta nova política, percebe-se 
que os argumentos ontológicos em torno desta questão, ou seja o problema da não-identidade é complexo. Eu proponho o 
conceito de responsabilidade reprodutiva como uma resposta para a vida possível. Este conceito pressupõe uma relação entre 
o agente reprodutivo e a possível nova vida. Uma vez que o conceito desenha um padrão normativo desta relação, ele resolve 
o problema da não-identidade e torna possível criticar a nova política de subsidiar ART.
Palavras-chave: reprodução, direitos reprodutivos, responsabilidade reprodutiva, tecnologia de reprodução assistida
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Introduction
Since 2006, the Korean government has imple-
mented the “National Support Program for In-
fertile Couples,” which subsidizes artificial repro-
ductive technology (ART), including in vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) and in uterine insemination(IUI), 
for married couples. This program aims to address 
the low birth rate in Korea, which has emerged as 
a serious problem in Korean society along with 
the issues raised by aging. However, consumed by 
the fear of a future shortage of workers, the gover-
nment fails to understand the impact of its inter-
vention on women’s bodies, and to demonstrate 
appropriate concern for female citizens and for the 
children who will be born of these women. The 
government has paid attention exclusively to how 
many babies are born, and it has failed to conduct 
any study that would address the quality of life 
of these newborns, i.e., follow-up studies on the 
health status of babies born through the IVF and 
IUI subsidy program and that of their mothers. 
With the figures showing a relatively large average 
number of embryo transfers in Korea compared 
to other countries(1) and frequent multiple births 
following IVF, it is reasonable to conclude that 
preterm birth and low birth weight, which are 
common in multiple pregnancies, have contribu-
ted to the recent increase in NICU admissions(2). 
According to its own claims, the subsidy program 
has resulted in the birth of children who would 
not have been born were it not for the program. 
Thus, the program has resulted in some negative 
health outcomes among newborns. Some believe 
that this policy harms the newborns. Moreover, 
the policy seems even worse since it treats a fu-
ture child just as a number, contributing to the 
goal of a higher birth rate, i.e., a means to solving 
a problem facing the current generation. Besides 
looking at a big picture, the government need to 
consider the health problems of children that is 
caused by the policy
However, in attempting to articulate the shortco-
mings of this new policy, a complex  ontologi-
cal problem is raised: the non-identity problem. 
Although the subsidy program lacks appropriate 
concern for the quality of life of those who will 
be born due to its existence, it is impossible for 
the life in question to exist without the program. 
Therefore, it does not seem to be wrong, for the 
sake of the child, to bring him/her into the world 
by means of this program. This notion is contrary 
to our everyday thinking and common-sense jud-
gment. We need a concept that resolves the non-
identity problem, making it possible to endow 
the new life with importance.
The non-identity problem
The non-identity problem arises when a repro-
ductive action causes both human existence and 
a flaw in that existence at the same time and, fur-
thermore, causes existence and the flaw in that 
existence in an inseparable way. With a 14-year-
old girl’s reproduction case, Parfit(3:358) presen-
ted the example of causing both negative life con-
ditions and life itself. 
This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is 
so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. 
Though this will have bad effects throughout this 
child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth li-
ving. If this girl had waited for several years, she 
would have given her child a better start in life.
Parfit pointed out that it is not possible to op-
pose the 14-year-old girl’s reproduction for the 
sake of the child who will be born as the result of 
the act. According to Parfit, it is impossible for 
the child to complain by comparing his situa-
tion with the situation where he was born to a 
24-year-old mother. He has to compare among 
the alternatives that would have been possible for 
him. Here, since the boy who would have been 
born to a 24-year-old mother is not the same per-
son, the only alternative to his real life would be 
nonexistence. If, as Parfit presumes, life is better 
than nonexistence, the child cannot condemn his 
own birth. 
Presupposed in defining non-identity as a pro-
blem is the comparative conception of harm and 
the condition of fixed identity, which is required 
because the comparison must be made among 
possible alternative experiences of a single indi-
vidual(4). In the vignette for the non-identity 
problem, to decide whether the flaw that accom-
panies the creation of a life constitutes harm, 
one must compare the self-interest in each of the 
two possible alternatives for the very individual 
who actually has the flaw in one’s life; self inter-
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est in the flawed life vs self interest of nonexis-
tence. A classical non-identity problem, such as 
Parfit’s case, sidesteps the fundamental problem. 
By adding the premise, “life will be worth living,” 
the answer becomes inevitable that a flawed life is 
preferable to no life at all. So, the flawed life does 
not amount to harm. However, for the sake of 
discussion, let us not uncritically accept the une-
xamined premise about flawed life and nonexis-
tence. If we reject that premise, we face another 
fundamental problem: one cannot compare two 
different options that an individual would expe-
rience because in one option, there is no existence 
to experience anything. In other words, having 
experienced only existence, we cannot know 
about nonexistence and, therefore, cannot com-
pare existence and nonexistence. Therefore, the 
non-identity problem leads us to the point where 
we, at least on behalf of future children, cannot 
reach any conclusion.
To sum up, what makes non-identity problem a 
problem is the premise that morally defective ac-
tion can be understood through the concept of 
comparative harm and the resulting requirement 
that the comparison be between alternatives avai-
lable to the same individual. These cause a real 
problem, both epistemologically and ontologi-
cally, when they are applied under the condition 
of nonexistence, which no one has experienced. 
Nonetheless, if we try to make a moral judgment 
about reproductive action, the premise and requi-
rement are not actually necessary. Avoiding the 
premise, we can solve the non-identity problem 
and reach a moral judgment that is coherent with 
our intuition on reproductive actions. Moreover, 
we can develop directives regarding reproductive 
issues that are congruent with a larger moral sys-
tem. 
Moral contractualism and reproductive action
If we broaden our view from a comparative con-
cept of harm to relationships, we can avoid the 
impossible exercise of comparing existence with 
nonexistence, and we can make moral judgments 
about reproductive actions. One way we can ar-
ticulate the key moral requirement is to ask what 
we owe to each other, invoking Scanlon’s moral 
contractualism(5:147-148)2. In moral contrac-
tualism, justifiability to others determines mora-
lity, i.e., what is right and what is wrong.
“It [contractualism] holds that an act is wrong if 
its performance under the circumstances would 
be disallowed by any set of principles related to 
the general regulation of behavior that no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement” (5:153).
Presenting morality as the requirement of justi-
fiability to others, Scanlon argues that the source 
of the power of this requirement is relationships 
with others. In other words, relationships that we 
enter by abiding by the moral requirement are in 
themselves appealing, and it is from this that the 
morality of right and wrong gains power. Since 
we have reason to want this ideal relationship of 
mutual recognition, we owe one another the re-
quirement of justification as an expression of res-
pect for the value of a person who has “reason 
assessing, self-governing” capacity(5:106).
Let us extend this theory of moral contractua-
lism, which originally considered only existing 
people, to the issue of reproduction. A possible 
life3 can deservedly enter into this relationship of 
mutual recognition that is the basis of morality, 
thereby earning the right to receive the justifi-
cation of acts from other moral agents. The fact 
that mutual recognition is the motivational basis 
of morality and therefore decides the content of 
morality demands that the relationship be suffi-
ciently broad and abstract. In other words, the re-
lationship should not be beneficial only to a cer-
tain group of people or limited to the actual per-
son before me to whom I must justify my action. 
Therefore, the possible life we are considering can 
be included and should be included in this broad 
and abstract relationship as well. It is because the 
possible life, despite the fact that it does not now 
exist, establishes a certain type of reciprocity with 
2 See also Kumar’s application of Scanlon’s contractualism to the issue 
of the non-identity problem. This article is indebted to his previous 
contribution in many ways. Especially on two premises in section 2, 
and on the legitimate expectation in section 4, I draw on his analysis 
much(4).
3 Hereinafter I will call all possible future people “possible life.” That 
category ranges from a mere possible “being,” someone who does not 
exist as fetus or as embryo, to someone in the early stage of human 
life who cannot yet be called a person
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us. Consider the conditions for the relationship 
of mutual recognition. If mutual recognition and 
agreement on principle are to adequately describe 
the moral system, they must include an explana-
tion of the process by which new members are 
continuously invited into the relationship. Becau-
se the moral contract cannot subsist as a one-time 
agreement among adult human beings who will 
someday die, the invitation of new members is 
a necessary part of the contract. Therefore, adult 
moral agents should show respect toward new 
members of the moral relationship even when 
they do not have the same capacity for rational 
assessment and self-governance. This invitation is 
mutually beneficial. For new members like pos-
sible life who will later understand this contract, 
equal treatment with respect is provided. For exis-
ting members like us, adding new members to the 
moral relationship is beneficial because it allows 
the expectation that the morality we construct 
will persist in the future, even after our death, and 
the expectation supports our own, current moral 
system(6:15-50). Hence, recognizing a possible 
life as a participant in morality and preparing jus-
tification for our actions toward him or her, as 
morality requires, are beneficial not only to the 
possible life but also to living people. Considering 
this reciprocity, it is reasonable to include possible 
life in the moral relationship of mutual recogni-
tion, where the morality of right and wrong are 
demarcated in the broad scope of morality. Thus, 
the right action that is required in this relations-
hip is to act justifiably rather than simply refrai-
ning from doing harm. Therefore, we do not have 
to be preoccupied with the comparative concep-
tion of harm and the condition of fixed identity. 
As a result, we can be free from the non-identity 
problem.
If we depend on justifiability when we judge the 
morality of reproduction, then it is clear that the 
reproductive agent is required to justify one’s 
reproductive act to others. Here, a possible life, 
which could be created by the reproductive act, is 
definitely included in others. It is worthwhile to 
note that in Scanlon’s moral contractualism, the-
re are two others whom one considers when one 
tries to act morally(5:202-206). First are those to 
whom the agent owes justification; in our inves-
tigation on reproductive ethics, the possible life. 
Second are those who decide whether the candi-
date moral principle should be rejected or not; in 
our investigation, every moral agent who can be 
described as taking a broader and abstract pers-
pective. So moral contractualism demands that 
a reproductive agent justify reproduction to the 
first others —the possible life—using the princi-
ple that could not be reasonably rejected by the 
second others—every moral agent who is motiva-
ted to find the moral principle which could not 
be reasonably rejected. This distinction of two 
others enables us to prepare an answer that is re-
asonably acceptable to both the possible life that 
does not yet exist and every moral agent.
The basic setting of justification, which is the re-
lationship, not only resolves the non-identity pro-
blem, as shown, but also defines the contents of 
actions that can be justified. Let’s imagine how the 
justification would happen for a reproductive act. 
The justification will be preparatory by its very na-
ture because the possible life who will receive the 
justification does not exist when the act of repro-
duction is performed; the possible lives might ask 
later when they achieve ability to ask, “why did 
you bring me here?” Preparing the future answer 
and acting accordingly are the immediate requi-
rements for the justification. For example, if an 
agent concludes that she cannot justify to a pos-
sible life her act of creating that life, then she is 
required to forgo the act of reproduction. Alter-
natively, a potential reproductive agent may con-
clude that the creation of a new human being can 
be justified in the given situation. Then the agent 
would feel prepared to answer the future question 
to a possible life. However, the agent would also 
recognize that one cannot justify any reproductive 
action only with a one-time positive conclusion in 
a hypothetical dialogue, since the determination 
of the act’s justifiability would require several con-
ditions to be met, such as guaranteeing qualified 
childrearing, abstaining from harmful acts during 
pregnancy, and believing that positive life condi-
tions will be available for the possible life conside-
ring all factors related to the potential parent and 
the future society. If the agent arrives at a positi-
ve conclusion while assuming several conditions 
should be met in the future, this leads to prospec-
tive responsibility; she must satisfy the conditions 
if the satisfaction is up to her. 
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Reproductive responsibility
I would like to propose the term “reproductive 
responsibility” to conceptualize the moral obliga-
tion I described above, which is the obligation to 
prepare and live by the future answer to possible 
life. Reproductive responsibility is apt word for 
the purpose because its Hebrew/Jewish etymolo-
gical origin, the word responsibility, contains the 
concepts discussed in the previous section, about 
moral contractualism; answering to other(s) in a 
relation(7). Moreover, the word has the nuance of 
preparing for the future encounter. It is because 
the archetype of responsibility in Hebrew/Jewish 
tradition has been of course preparing an answer 
for the day of final judgment(7). Therefore the 
term, reproductive responsibility, can convey the 
idea of preparing an answer to possible life even 
though possible life is not before us now. 
Viewed in light of the etymological nuance of 
responsibility, reproductive responsibility expects 
us to participate in a dialogue with possible life. 
But how can one participate in a dialogue with 
someone who does not yet exist and imagine the 
response? Through the hypothetical dialogue, one 
can still prepare her answer beforehand relying 
on the judgment of generic reason that possible 
life would have in her position. Scanlon expla-
ins that generic reasons are “reasons that we can 
see that people have in virtue of their situation, 
characterized in general terms, and such things 
as their aims and capabilities and the conditions 
in which they are placed”(5:204), while Kumar, 
when he applies Scanlon’s moral contractualism 
to reproduction, uses the term, “legitimate expec-
tation”(4), showing more explicitly the link bet-
ween what one is entitled to and the relationship 
in which one stands. In the relationship between 
the reproductive agent and the possible life, the 
position in which possible life stands is that of a 
future child. Therefore, the possible life is entit-
led to what can be legitimately expected in that 
position. As Kumar correctly points out, it does 
not matter exactly who the child would be —the 
individual identity— in that position. What mat-
ters in deciding generic reason or legitimate ex-
pectation is the characterization of the situation, 
including the position in the relationship. Once 
again, when we imagine a dialogue in a relations-
hip, non-identity is not a problem anymore.
Reproductive responsibility arises when we try to 
respond to the possible life, based on the relation-
ship between reproductive agent and possible life. 
This interpretation of reproductive responsibili-
ty leads the agents to prospective responsibility 
which embraces the full range of parenthood, 
not limited to the retrospective responsibility 
concerning the harm to possible life. There have 
been attempts to explain reproductive responsi-
bility or parental responsibility in retrospective 
way(8,9:103-127). In this explanation, repro-
ductive/parental responsibility arises as a result 
of the reproductive agent’s engendering harm.4 
This is the way of understanding the concept of 
responsibility largely in terms of what an agent 
is responsible for. If one understands reproduc-
tive responsibility in this way, a possible life or 
newborn is primarily seen as a product of repro-
ductive acts. The problem in this approach is that 
when the responsibility is understood to have 
arisen from the harm, and therefore retrospec-
tively, the scope of responsibility is so minima-
listic that it cannot embrace all the actions and 
attitudes parents will do and show toward their 
children during their lifetime. If one restores the 
etymological meaning of responsibility, which is a 
dialogue in a relationship, then being responsible 
always means responsible to someone. In this way 
of understanding, a possible life is seen as one to 
whom a reproductive agent(s) owes justification. 
The strong point of this way of understanding of 
reproductive responsibility is that one can em-
brace the full range of what parents are expected 
to do for their children. Since the legitimate ex-
pectation is drawn from the position in the rela-
tionship which the possible life will occupy, its 
range is broad enough to include all aspects of 
adequate rearing. Here, we can see the significant 
link between reproductive responsibility and pa-
rental responsibility or obligation which female 
commentators have long pointed out(10,11). The 
various aspects of responsibility that are included 
in the role of parent cannot be sufficiently explai-
ned by responsibility for the harm done. What is 
required to describe the actual psychology of re-
productive agents is responsibility to possible life, 
in other words, preparing the answer and living 
by the answer. In this chapter I tried to define 
4 The harm includes death and other negative events that are in-
evitable in life and the potential harm that can occur if there is no 
adequate care and rearing from parents.
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an obligation in reproductive ethics by using the 
term reproductive responsibility, in an attempt to 
apply a contractualist framework to the morality 
of right and wrong to questions of reproductive 
ethics. I believe that this approach helps us to 
decide right and wrong though the test of justi-
fiability toward the possible life. Eventually the 
test should be applied also to the policy of ART 
subsidy.
Implications of the policy of subsidizing re-
productive technology 
Despite a total of more than 728 million USD 
poured to the subsidy program since 2006 to 
2017(12-16), the birth rate has not increased sig-
nificantly; total fertility rate in 2006 was 1.12 and 
was 1.17 in 2016(17). Why did increased access 
to medical technology not remedy the low birth 
rate? Could the concept of reproductive respon-
sibility explain and diagnose the phenomenon? I 
believe so. Lack of capability(18) to rear children 
may contribute to the low birth rate in Korea. 
Since people believe they should practice repro-
ductive responsibility, the instruction discoura-
ging reckless reproduction when one cannot pre-
pare the just answer to possible life, they wouldn’t 
have reproduced. The subsidy program only 
shows government’s urgency but does not provi-
de individuals with a reliable resource for capabi-
lity to rear one’s child. Accordingly, the policy is 
bound to be ineffective at raising the birth rate. It 
is noteworthy that capability depends on the con-
text. Capability to rear a child may differ depen-
ding on macro/micro level societal structure and 
people’s belief inside that structure. With this un-
derstanding of capability, one can see why in Ko-
rea, despite a per capita GDP in excess of 25,000 
USD, people still feel they do not have enough 
resources to rear a child. Gender inequality in the 
workplace is a serious problem in Korea despite 
the high rate of higher education among women. 
When companies and institutions do not provide 
equal opportunity, begetting, bearing, and rearing 
one’s child becomes more burdensome to women. 
Privatization of social welfare services such as day-
care are also an obstacle to parenthood. Pressu-
re on parents to elevate their children’s class and 
status in society further compounds the problem; 
because class elevation through higher education 
is common in East Asia, excessive investment 
in children’s education has become a norm for 
many people. This has reached the point where 
average child rearing expenses through college 
graduation exceed 230,000 USD(19) per child. 
Considering per capita GDP, this is definitely a 
great burden. Moreover, unlike in the past, even 
a college degree does not guarantee a decent life. 
As economic growth has slowed, an individual’s 
efforts cannot make as dramatic change in class as 
was possible in the past. This gloomy perspective 
gets worse with people’s feeling of insecurity. This 
pessimism and anxiety towards the future adds to 
the burden of being a parent. Sadly, since poten-
tial parents of today are the ones who were rai-
sed with excessive investment from their parents, 
they tend to stick to the high standard of being 
parents; they see themselves as having a responsi-
bility to guarantee their children a decent life as 
their parents did for them. Therefore, even with 
relatively high GDP—much higher than that of 
the previous generation--people see themselves as 
incapable of being good parents. We can recogni-
ze that reproductive responsibility is a real factor 
to potential parents in this omnishambles. People 
hesitate to have a child because they feel unequip-
ped to answer the question why they brought this 
possible life into existence. They know their child 
may not be happy in this world. They know what 
they must accomplish as parents but they also 
know they cannot. Making people physically able 
to become parents does not solve the problem. 
Thus far, I have argued that the current low birth 
rate in Korea may be the result of the lack of ca-
pability to rear children. And I have argued that 
in this situation, abstaining from unjustifiable, 
or at least questionable, act of having a baby is 
a reasonable way of exercising reproductive res-
ponsibility. If so, what are the ethical and poli-
cy implications of the subsidy program? Now I 
will argue that since the policy essentially ignores 
reproductive responsibility—both that of indivi-
duals and of the government itself— the policy is 
not only inefficient and but also ethically wrong. 
First, the program ignores potential parents’ re-
productive responsibility. The subsidy program 
has been ineffective because it did not reflect an 
understanding that people would not be mobi-
lized with medical support only. Since it does 
not help people believe that they are capable of 
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fulfilling reproductive responsibility, increasing 
accessibility to ART cannot significantly increase 
the birth rate. Although the program is intended 
to mobilize as many childbearing age couples as 
possible, only those having a medical need and 
sufficient resources to prepare justifiable answer 
to possible life actually responded. Since this 
policy was conducted with taxpayers’ money, its 
misguided targeting and resulting inefficiency are 
blameworthy. However, the policy deserves even 
more criticism based on its inadequate attitude 
toward citizens. The policy ignored the fact that 
potential parents bear reproductive responsibility 
and in so doing, treated them as a mere means 
to an end. Because the policy views women me-
rely as reproductive agents, it fails to take into 
consideration women’s decision making process 
in having children. Bioethics should resist this 
policy and reaffirm that citizens deserve respect. 
Respecting a person requires recognizing his or 
her “reason-assessing and self-governing(5:106)” 
capacity. Where possible reproduction is concer-
ned, it requires not reducing potential parents 
to their reproductive function but to the unique 
perspectives and moral obligations that motiva-
te them as future parents. While the government 
does not recognize the importance of this, poten-
tial parents already consider reproductive respon-
sibility as their moral obligation. As they endure 
this disrespectful treatment by the government, 
people do not respond to the subsidy program. 
Second, by neglecting the government’s repro-
ductive responsibility, the subsidy program also 
shows a lack of concern for possible life. Although 
government itself does not physically beget and 
bear a child, it creates the conditions in which 
children are born. Therefore, government bears 
its own reproductive responsibility, in its unique 
form. More specifically, government has a duty to 
treat people with respect and, in so doing, invite 
the new generation to a moral society. However, 
the Korean government failed to carry this repro-
ductive responsibility as its subsidy policy lacked 
the research into the welfare of possible life, such 
as follow-up health care for newborns from the 
program(1). Treated only as a statistics in the 
target birth rate or as a solution to the current 
problem, possible lives are deprived of the oppor-
tunity to be respectfully invited into a moral so-
ciety where they will contribute to continuity and 
stability. To summarize, the subsidy program not 
only has failed to raise the birth rate, as a matter 
of reproductive responsibility it is also morally 
unjustifiable. 
Conclusion
In this article, I conceptualize reproductive res-
ponsibility as an obligation to justify, to the new 
life him/herself, the decision to bring new life 
into world. This study was conducted to clarify 
and justify my opposition to both the Korean 
government’s policy of subsidizing ART and to 
the attitudes underpinning the policy. Although 
the policy largely regards women and future gene-
rations as instruments for increasing the birthrate, 
the non-identity problem has rendered it difficult 
to criticize the policy based on considerations re-
lated to future generations. My conceptualization 
of reproductive responsibility resolves this pro-
blem and leads to mutual recognition. I believe 
that this concept is consistent with O’Neill’s ac-
curate understanding of the importance of the in-
tention to “beget, bear, and rear” a child in the act 
of reproduction(10), and also clarifies the factors 
that most women actually consider important 
when contemplating the issue of reproduction.
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